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We may begin with the question, Was FDA the correctanswer to the prob-
lem of ghetto unemployment and low income? Ina detailed and incisive
an.lysis of the experience of FDA in Oakland, California, Pressman arid
Wildavsky (1973) have answered with an unequivocal no.2
Unemployment was a serious problem in Oakland during the 1 960s. Theun-
t employment rate for men stood at 8 percent in 1960; it dipped to 6.6percent
by 1966, but had increased to 7.8 percent by 1970. Corresponding rates for
women workers were 7.8 percent in 1960, 10.8 percent in 1966, and 8 percent
5 in 1970.1
II During the 1960s an increasing proportion of Oakland residents found jobs
outside the community. In 1960, for example, 69 percent of all employed resi-
dents of Oakland worked in the city; by '1970, this had dropped to 50.6per-
e cent. Most of those who found jobs outside Oakland were working in San
e Francisco, elsewhere in Alameda County, or in ContraCosta county. Details are
e given in Table 1.
As in other metropolitan areas, the problem of unemployment was particu-
larly acute among young black men in Oakland. A successful attackon this
problem would have involved more than simply creating job openingsal-
though that, of course, was a necessary precondition. Many of the unem-
A ployed youth of Oakland were school dropouts who lacked even the most
Cr- rudimentary skills. The Office of Economic Opportunity.had recognized the
complexity of the Oakland unemployment problem. It had launched a special
program to assist unemployed young adults interested in transforming them-
selves from school dropouts into workers employed in the conventional labor




Place of Work 1960 1966 1970a196019661970
Total 147,340151,330140,097100%100%100%
Oakland 101,640 91,860 70,931 69.0 60.7 50.6
OtherAlaniedacounty 27,470 32,07028,386 18.7 21.2 20.3
San Franasco 11,960 17,640 13,565 8.1 11.7 9.7
ContraCosta county 3,300 5,840 3,835 2.2 3.9 2.7
Mann, San Mateo,
Solano 1,140 2,040 NA - - -
Outside SMSA 1,830 1,890 NA - - -
Inside SMSA 117,998 84.2392
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market. This program.called TIDE, was not notably successful (Wellrnan 1971)
Indeed in pickingOakland as the place to launch a concerted attack On ghetto
unemployment and low income,EDA had selected a very difficult target witha
low probability of success.
With the exception ofthe West Oakland Health Center, a relatively small
project, the EDA experiencein Oakland was judged a failure by Pressman and
\Vildavsky. II that was the case,it was a failure of substantial proportions since
more that $26million had been spent onfifty-three projects by the endof
calendar 1972 (FDA 1972, Pp.4447).
According to Pressman andWildavsky, too many agencies were involved in
Oakland. and there were too manyconflicting interest groups for FDA to deal
with. This led to an inordinatenumber of decision points. There were too many
objectives and constraints for a programof limited resources. The objectives
included projects designed to stimulategrowth, which implies that theywere
expected to have substantial employmentmultipliers. To be acceptal)le to
EDA, the projects had to be administrativelyand financially sound. They were
also supposed to provide jobs for a significant numberof Oakland's unem-
ploved black population. Few of the unemployed had the requisite skills for the
projects planned; hence, effective training programs were essential if the pro-
jects were to succeed. As a result, the Department of Labor became involved
in the overall policy design.
A special task force, made up primarily of young FDA staff members, was as-
signed to expedite the Oakland project. But the Washington staff of EDA ap-
parently did not share the sense of urgency expressed by the Oakland task
force, and there is no evidence that the existence of the task force actually
speeded matters up. There were interminable delays and cost overruns, prob-
lems that have plagued innumerable public works programs, both in and out of
FDA, in recent years. Therefore, Pressman and Wildavsky concluded that EDA
is not the answer to the nation's urban economic problems.
The conclusion reached by Pressman and Wildavsky did not go unchal-
ienged. Their book had been reviewed favorably by Harry Schwartz in the New
York Times, and this spurred a letter to the editor by John H. Reading. the
mayor of Oakland.4 The mayor read Schwartz's review "with both sorrow and
indignation," and informed the reviewer that "the Port of Oakland has recently
reported to me that in excess of 5,000 jobs (about 40°/s minority) have been
created as a result of the Seventh Street Terminal and the industrial park."
It is difficult to make an objective evaluation of the claims and counterclaims
involved in this dispute. Dataare reported regularly for the San Francisco-Oak-
land labor market area, which includes Alameda,ContraCosta, Mann, San Fran-
cisco, and San Mateo counties. But becauseof the size of the area covered and
of the labor force, itis impossible to deduce anything about labor forcer
changes in a specific part of thatvast region. For what it is worth, however, the
available data show that between 1965 and1972 the unemployment rate in
the labor market area had goneup from 5.0 to 5.7 percent.5
If FDA is not the answer to urbaneconomic distress, is it the correct ap-
proach to the problems of smaller depressedindustrial areas? These areas,
which include such communitiesas Lawrence and Lowell in Massachusetts;
Utica-Rome, New York; Asheville and Durham,North Carolina; Altoona and
Erie, Pennsylvania; and Providence, Rhode Island,were the focus of the area
development legislation that was introducedrepeatedly but without success
during the 1 950s. To gain the politicalsupport necessary to insure passage,
sponsors of the proposed legislation broadened itscoverage to include rural
areas. In this form a bill was signed into lawon May 1, 1961, by President Ken-
ned)' as the first major act of his administration.6
The Area Redevelopment Act markeda turning point in American public
policy. It represented a rejection of the free-marketmodel of regional adjust-
ment to structural change so highly regarded by conservatives. Thatmodel ig-
nored the rigidities and immobilites that contributedto market failure in de-
pressed areas. Sponsors and supporters of theact recognized the existence of
market imperfections. The objective of thenew area redevelopment effort was
to get things moving again in depressed areas by reviving their privatesectors.
Heavy reliance was placed on loans and grants to private borrowerswho in-
tended to locate new facilities or expand their economicactivities in eligible
depressed areas, and this approach was generally regarded by theconservative
press a; a dangerous federal incursion into the private domain.
There are many reasons why the Area Redevelopment Actwas not renewed
in its original form (some of these are discussed in Levitan 1964). Forone thing,
it probably was not given enough time to work. Too muchwas expected of it
too soon, and this led to early congressional disenchantment. Itwas evident by
1964 that a majority of congressmen would no longer support theprogram.
And when ARA was replaced by FDA in 1965, therewas a major shift in em-
phasis. This is indicated, among other things, by the title of the act that estab-
lished the Economic Development Administration. Itwas called the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. Although business loansin-
cluding working capital guaranteeswere permitted by the new legislation,
the overwhelming bulk of obligations, as indicated in Table 2, was committed
to public works.
Between 1 965 and June 30, 1973, more than $1 .9 billion had been com-
mitted by FDA. More than three-fourths of this amount went to some 3.000
public works projects. About 7 percent of the total outlay was for technicalas-
sistance and planning grants. Only 1 7 percent, or about $327 million, of total
obligations, went to private businesses in the form of loans and guarantees of








rceTABLE 2Summary of EDit-obligated Projects by Program,Cumulative to
June 30, 1973
(dollars in thousands)
SOURCE:ECOflOflO!( Devefoprrient Administration, Office of F'ubhcAffairs
ainciudOt seventy-seven working captaI guarantees.
bDeta,t does not add to total because ijf rounding.
working capital. It is evident that theadministrators of EDA felta strong corn-
imtment to the public works side of regionaleconomic development. The ra-
tionale for investment in socialoverhead capital is that public works willim-
prove an area's competitive position. Thisin turn is expected to stimulate
growth in the private sector.
TUE EVOLUTION OF A REGIONALDEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
From a political point of view,investment in public works is lesshazardous
than private business loans andgrants. It is hard to Criticize theconstruction of sewers, airport improvements,or industrial park facilitieson ideological
grounds. Furthermore, there isphysical evidence ofaccomplishment when the
construction is completed. But will publicworks have the desired effectof
stimulating expansion in theprivate sector of depressedareas? That is the
question of prime interest toarea development administrators.
Another question that hadto be answered during the earlydays o FDA was how to chooseamong the large number ofcommunities and development dis-
tricts eligible for assistance.One option was to chooseprojects with a high probability of success. Acommunity might approach EDA witha requesi for funds to expand itswater supply, for example. Thebasis of this request might
be evidence thata firm had already agreed to locatea plant in the community if the necessary volumeof process water could bemade available. If FDA would move quicklyto help this communityovercome its locational defi-





Public works 3,008 45.30/0 $1,440,097 75.6%
Business development loans.' 413 6.2 326,783 1 7.2
Technical assistance 2,302 34.7 93,803 4.9
Planninggrants 914 13.8 44,196 2.3
Totals 6,63? 100.0 1,904,884 100.0[DAand the Objectives ofRegional Development Policy 395
Another possible strategywas that of selecting themost seriously depressed
communities for concentrated publicinvestment. This is knownas the 'worst- first" strategy, and it is theone that gradually evolved inFDA.7 Unfortunately,a worst-first strategy has onlya limited chance of success inthe conditions under which EDA operated.With limited funds anda large number of desig-
nated eligible areas, itwas impossible for IDA to makethe kinds of massive in-
vestments that would have beenrequired to turn aroundsome of the seriously
depressed areas chosen forassistance. FDA did not formallydisavow its worst- first approachamove that almost certainly wouldhave had unfavorablepo-
litical repercussions_but after1968 there was a gradual shiftin strategy.
Section 403 of the act authorizedthe Secretary of Commerceto designate
appropriate "economic developmentdistricts" and economicdevelopment centers." A number of grantswere made to help planningorganizations define
district boundaries and identifygrowth centers. Theeconomic advantages ot
concentrating investments in growthcenters are fairly obvious. Ian area is truly a growth center theremust he some reason for expectingit to grow. A
major improvement intransportation facilities might givea community loca-
tional advantages that had beendenied it in the past. Publicworks investment
in a community of this kind couldresult in a fairly large payoff. Thestrategy of
concentrating public investment in growthcenters is easy to defend, if the cri-
terion for selection is the probabilityof success. To be successful,however, a
growth center strategy wouldrequire a fairly high degree of selectivity.But se-
lectivity has little appeal tomembers of Congress, each of whom islooking for
benefits that will accrue to hisor her district. The required degree of selectivity
would no doubt be unacceptableto a majority of congressmen. Partly because
of the political difficulties ofpursuing an economically viable growthcenter
strategy, EDA has been forcedto spread its funds for investment in public
works widely.
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE PUBLIC WORKS?
It is always easier to evaluate direct thanindirect effects. The effects ofa loan
to an establishment to locatea new facility in a depressed area or expandan
existing one can be evaluated in terms ofjobs created and new incomegener-
ated in the community. Similarly, theinvestment impact can be measured in
cases where there is a direct link betweena public facility investment and the
location of one or morenew plants in a community. In general, however, the
connection between public facility investment andregional economic de-
velopment is a more tenuousone. There may be little or no short-run impact,
and it is not easy to measure long-run impacts.I
The outstanding example in the United States of public facilitiesinvestment
with a development objective is the Appalachian Regional DevelopmentPro-
gram; the definitive study is by Newman (1972). Unlike EDA, all of the Appala-
chian Regional Commission's (ARC) investments have been in public facilities,
and the largest single investment has been in the AppalachianDevelopment
highways. Other investments have been in health and education facilities,and
there have been relatively modest expenditures on land reclamationand ero-
sion control. Under the ARC, however, there have beenno direct investments
comparable to the business loans and working capital guaranteesof EDA.
Appalachia is generally regarded as the most seriously depressedregion in
the nation. But there is nothing in the Appalachian RegionalDevelopment pro.-
gram that is designed to provide immediate economic relief to the region'sresi-
dents in need of assistance. The heavy emphasison highway construction in
Appalachia has been criticized on the grounds that the highwayfunds would
have been put to a better purpose ii they had been usedto assist regional resi-
dents to relocate to other areas with better jobopportunities. Some critics
have mistakenly viewed the emphasison highway construction as an attempt
to provide employment for some of the region's unemployedcoal miners.
They argued, quite correctly, that the highwayprogram would have relatively
little direct employment impact sirce much ofthe construction work would be
done by firms located outside the region.These firms would bring theirown
equipment and machine operators to the jobsites. The Critics were correct in
their assessment of the minor employmentimpact the highway program
would have, but they completelymisconstrued the objectives of theprogram.
The decision to invest heavilyin highways at the outset, rather thanin
human resources, was basedon the view that this ordering of prioritieswould
have the greatest economic impacton the region in the long run. Now that
the highway system has been completelyplanned, and actual constructionhas
reached the halfway mark, thecommission has shifted its emphasisto invest-
ment in human resources. It is beginningto invest more heavily in health and
education facilities. But theseinvestments also are expectedto yield economic
benefits only in the longrun.
It is only possible to evaluatethe development imoact ofpublic works by
using an appropriate time horizon.The regional problems thatARA, FDA, and ARC were designed tocope with appear to have been"discovered" rather suddenly. It was evidentlyimpossible to get a majority ofmembers of Con-
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new enterprises to the region. Thismay be scant evidence to goon, but it is
enough to convince me that theARC's ordering of prioritreswas the correct
one.
EDA PUBliC WORKSDISBURSEMENTS
The public works projects thathave been supported by EDAare far more di-
verse and more widely diffused than theAppalachian Regional Development
Program.
By the end of 1972, FDA hadparticipated in 2,750 public works projects. For
the purposes of thispaper, I classified EDA's investments in theseprojects ac-
cording to the followingcategories: (1) a direct link to economicdevelop-
ment, (2) an indirect link to economicdevelopment, or (3) an amenity invest-
ment.8
Direct Link
For the project to be included in thiscategory, there had to be a clear indica-
tion that the FDA investmentwas tied to a particular economic activity which
would not have located or expandedin the community unless that specific
public works project was completed. Inmost cases, the type of plant involved
was clearly identifiable. If the report on the projectmentioned a firm by type or
industry, the project was classifiedas direct.
Each of the 2,750 entries in FDA (1972)was checked for any reference to an
industrial park, site, building, road, siteimprovement, rail spur, lighting installa-
tion, dock, ramp, or other indication that theinvestment could lead to a specif-
ic kind of economic activity. Initially, allentries mentioning facilities other than
residential water or sewer constructionor government buildings were
checked. About 600 entrieswere obtained in this initial step. Additional de-
tailed information on each entrywas then sought in EDA's monthly publica-
tion, Economic Development. Detailswere available for about three-fourths of
the entries. Each of the sample projectsin the Boise Cascade and FDA Task
Force evaluations of public works projectswas also examined to obtain infor-
mation about major projects not mentioned in EconomicDevelopment. In a
number of cases the evaluation studies provided theonly detailed information
required for accurate classification; the Boise Cascadeand FDA Task Force
evaluations are discussed below.
Indirect Link
This category contains projects approved becausethey removed some barrier
to industrial or commercial expansion, but whichwere not tied to a particular398 William I-I. Miernyk
firm. If a detailed account of a project mentioned in EconomicDe'.'elopmentor
the evaluation studies did not refer to a specific firm or industry, and ifthere
was not even a hint in the discussion that a given firm or industry wascon-
nected to the project, it was classified as indirect. Many of the projectsin this
category could be classified as speculative from the point of view of boththe
community involved and FDA. If, for example, an investment was madein an
industrial site that might or might not be occupied, it was consideredas an in-
direct link to economic development.
Amenity Investment
Projects approved because they served a community needor made the coni-
munity a better place to live were included in this category. Suchprojects
which include many water and sewer systemsmight makethe community
more attractive to a potential economic prospect. But if a project couldnot be
linked even in an indirect way toa specific economic activity it was classified
as an amenity. Such investments may have an economic impact,but there is
no guarantee that they will contribute to local economicdevelopment. As in-
dicated below, almost 79 percent of EDA publicworks disbursements through
1972 were classified as arrienity investments; thedata are from EDA (1972):
The state distribution of EDAdisbursements by type of investmentand the
percent dstribution of population andincome are given in Table 3.By and
large, low-income states receivedmore than their proportionate share ofFDA
disbursements, although the largestsingle amount went to California,a high-
income state, with nearly one-thirdof that amount goingto Oakland. Almost
45 percent of the fundsallocated to Californiawere for projects with director indirect links to economicdevelopment. By way ofcontrast, most of the funds that went to Alabama,a low-income state, were used foramenities. In general,
states receiving substantial EDApublic works grantswere more likely than not
to have used most of the fundsfor the improvement of localamenities. There
were some exceptions. FDAexpenditures in Alaska, for example,were used primarily for projects withdirect or indirect linksto economic development
The classification ofdisbursements on the basisof links to local economic










Total $861,061,000 100.0%FDA and the Objectives of RegionalDevelopment Policy 399
need for upgrading the water andsewer systems and other public facilitiesin
communities that requested FDA support. Onemay legitimately ask, however,
whether it was part of EDA's missionto provide such communitysupport.
From a development point of view, EDA wouldhave had a more impressive
record if its expenditures had been livitedto public works thatwere at least in-
directly linked to specific economic activities,and the record would have been
improved further if EDA expenditures had beenlimited to actual or potential
growth centers.9
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVALUATIONSOF EDA
Between 1970 and 1973, EDA commissioned nineteenevaluative studies, each
dealing with a specific aspect of the regional developmenteffort.1° Seven of
the evaluations were conducted by professionalconsultants; six, by the FDA
staff; five, by EDA task forces; and two, by academicconsultants. The studies
most relevant to the theme of this paper are the twoon business loans and
two others on the analysis of selected samples of EDA's publicworks activ-
ities.11
The commissioned studies vary widely in quality. Thosefocused on business
loans are the least ambiguous. A three-part study conductedby Booz, Allen
and Hamilton (1970), examined tencases in depth, subjected a sample of
forty-four firms assisted by FDA loans to less intensive study,and concluded
with a national assessment of the business loanprogram. No attempt will be
made to summarize the findings of the three bulky documents thatmake up
the report. However, some of the benefit-cost findingsmay be mentioned
briefly. BAH reported that during EDA's first fouryears, its business loans re-
sulted in almost 25,000 direct and indirect jobs, withan average annual wage
of $5,335. Using a discount rate of 5 percent, the authors estimatedthe pres-
ent value of the future income that would be generated by the direct and indi-
rect jobs to be over $1.3 billion (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1970, p.13).
An earlier study conducted jointly by Chilton Researrh Services and the
CONSAD Research Corporation examined the experience ofa sample of firms
granted loans in excess of $100,000 by the Area Redevelopment Administra-
tion or EDA prior to June 1968 (Chilton 1969). The forty firms examined had
received more than $23 million in loans. An estimated 1,800 new jobswere
created of which 11 percent went to previously unemployed workers, and
12 percent to new entrants to the labor force. Among the previouslyem-
ployed hired by the sample firms there was an increase in average annualearn-
ings of $1,393. The authors felt that most of the benefits of the loan program
accrued to workers above the "poverty line," but they also noted that in this





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fare rolls. They concluded that the benefits of theloan program far exceeded
its costs (Chilton 1969.pp. 2.4-2.6).
The evaluation of EDA public works projectsis a less direct exercise than the
evaluation of business loans. If a firm is givena loan to expand plant capacity,
and following the new investment it employsthirty additional workers, few
economists would challenge the conclusion that thenew jobs were a direct re-
sult of the loan, lithe capacity of a community'ssewer system is expanded,
and a local establishment adds thirtynew workers to its force, the increase in
employment may or may not bea direct result of the public works investment.
Evaluation of the economic impact of public worksis no doubt a more subjec-
tive process than the evaluation of loans. Yet effortsmust be made to conduct
such evaluations if public officials are to judge the effectiveness ofregional de-
velopment programs.
The Boise Cascade Center for Community Developmentand an FDA task
force separately evaluated the EDA public worksprograms. The Boise Cascade
study was based on evaluations of 149 projects. The sample ofprojects, in
which EDA had invested more than $51 million,was broadly representative of
the various types to receive EDA support. Ten projectswere eliminated from
the Boise analysis on the grounds that they would "have been approvabte
tinder the Act solely on the basis of their anticipated service impact" (Boise
Cascade 1970, p.25). Of the remaining 139 projects, 68percent had 'realized
job impact."12 The report concluded thata grand total of 23,757 "job equiva-
lents" resulted froni the public works projects (EDA 1970,p. 5). The authors
did not define a "job equivalent." Presumably, however, the term refers to the
equivalent of a full-time job. The detailed project summaries providemore in-
formation about the projects; it is from those studies that the employment
estimate given above was derived. In Table 3 and in the tabulation shown
above in the section on amenity investment, the projects that generated "job
equivalents" are included with those that are described as having either direct
or indirect links to economic development.
One study, which was conducted by the General Accounting Office; is
worth a comment. A report based on this study was submitted to Congress by
the Comptroller General (U.S. Comptroller General 1972). Like the other evalu-
ations discussed above, it was based on a sample survey. The GAO reviewed
150 projects for which grants and loans of $77.7 million were awarded. About
14 percent of the sample projects were regarded as "questionable" by the
GAO because the potential economic impact seemed 'nonexistent or very
low" (U.S. Comptroller General,p. 2). But the GAO, quite appropriately, did
not question either the premises behind FDA legislation or the feasibility of
economic development via the EDA route. It limited its assessment to admini-
strative pro'edures, and recommended that the Secretary of Commerce re-
quire FDA to "effectively coordinate its public works financial assistance pro-
grams with those of other Federal agencies and to urge the adoption of
EDA and the Objectives of Regional DevelopmentPolicy 403changes... to provide greater assurance that such agencies provide dVàiahIe
funds for projects .before EDA provides any financial assistarc("j s
Comptroller General, p. 2). The GAO also recommended that FDA adopt in.
proved procedures for evaluating the potential economic impact of proposed
projects, including benefit-cost analysis and appraisal of the timeliness of the
economic impact (U.S. Comptroller General, p. 30).
AN ALTERNATIVE REGIONAl. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
One reason for the failure of the Oakland experiment, in the view of Pressman
and Wildavsky, was the divorce of policy and implementation. fhe emphasisin
Oakland, they assert, was on 'designing the program, obtaining initialagree-
ment at the local level, and committing the funds. All this was done quickly
with fanfare and enthusiasm.... The later steps of implementation were felt to
be 'technical questions' that would resolve themselves if the initialagreements
were negotiated and commitments were made" (Pressman and Wildavsky
1973, p. 143). Implementation became bogged down in complexity, andthe
result was failure of the most important ventures planned for Oakland.
An important lesson may be learned from the Oakland experience,and it
may apply to other conirnunities where substantial FDA expenditures didnot
produce significant improvement in the local economy. The lessonis that sim-
plicity can be a virtue. The simplest regional policy, ofcourse, is that of laissez
faire. But while this continues to be the policy advocated bystaunch conserva-
tives it has one defect. It does not work. Thiswas the federal policy before
1961, and enough studies of depressedareas were made before that time to
show that market forces did little if anythingto improve conditions in de-
pressed areas, whether industrialor rural.
One of the causes of the failure of the Oaklandprogram, according to Press-
man and Wildavsky, was a conceptual deficiency: "Theeconomic theory was
faulty because it aimed at thewrong target.subsidizing the capital of busi-
ness enterprises rather than their wage bill. Instead oftaking the direct path of
paying the entire subsidy onwages after the companies had hired minority
personnel, the EDA program expanded theircapital on the promise that they
would later hire the right people"(Pressman and Wildavsky,p. 147).
The idea of a directwage subsidy is not a new one. Itwas suggested by John
Kain, for example, to the JointEconomic Committee, asone way to stimulate
employment of the hard-core urbanunemployed. Kain suggested that the sub-
sidy decline as the productivityof workers increased withtraining and on-the-
job experience (Pressman andWildavsky,p. 157).
There is a precedent for sucha subsidy, although not in the United States. A
Regional Employment Premiumwent into effect in Great Britain in September
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1967. It provided a direct subsidy to all manufacturing employers located with-
in development areas (the British counterparts of development districts in the
United States). It is estimated that the subsidy amounted to about 7 percent of
the wage billof eligible firms; further details are given in Miernyk 1969,
pp. 47-48. Unfortunately, the premium proved to be "a costly form of assis-
tance because it is so unselective...It is unlikely that REP has had any appre-
ciable effect in bringing new industry to the development areas' (Wilson
1973). The principle weakness of REP, it seems clear,was its lack of selectivity.
A highly selective wage subsidy could prove to be an important part of asuc-
cessful regional development strategy in the United States.
Pressman and Wildavsky may have been too quick in writing off the de-
velopment benefits of capital subsidies. Capital subsidiesgenerally in the
form of state and local tax abatementshave been used extensively in the
United States, and more recently in Canada, although without notable suc-
cess.11 It is possible, however, that this has not been the right kind of capital
subsidy. Since the early days of ARA, regional development administrators
have been disappointed that large corporations have shown no interest in re-
sponding to the modest inducements that have been given them to locate in
depressed areas. But why should the companies be iriterestedMarginal sav-
ings in interest costs mean little to firms that do not go into the market for ex-
pansion capital in any event. These firms might be induced to locate plants in
depressed areas, however, if they were given a substantial capital subsidy.
Since 1963, Brazilian corporations have been offered a major capital subsidy
if they invest in the severely depressed Brazilian Northeast. Under a law en-
acted in 1963, any Brazilian corporate entity may cut its inconie tax liability in
half, provided the half that is saved is invested in Northeastern projects ap-
proved by SUDENE, the federal development agency for the Brazilian North-
east, created in December 1959 (Hirschman 1 968, p. 5). The tax savings are de-
posited in blocked accounts and revert to the federal treasury, if they are not
used within three years for specific, approved projects. The problems of the
Brazilian Northeast have not been solved by this scheme, but Hirschman be-
lieves that the "industrialization dive 'uiuug:underway by the [tax crediti
mechanism is by far the most significant economic advance to take place in
Brazil's Northeast for many decades.. ." (Hirschrnan, p. 25). The Brazilian ap-
proach to a capital subsidy is unique. And while it might not by itself guarantee
the desired regional development consequences, a variant of this scheme
could be a significant part of a future regional development strategy iii the
United States.
There is an important difference between the Brazilian and other tax incen-
tive schemes. The Brazilian program allows firms to invest some share of their
profits, which otherwise would be paid in taxes, in admittedly risky new enter-
prises. But the firm has nothing to lose and possibly something to gain from in-
vesting its tax credit. This is a far cry from the practice of granting new plants406
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local tax relief. Indeed, thereare good reasons why new ta( ilitieslocated in (Ic-
pressed areas should not be exemptedfrom state uid localtcXC5 For Othing they are bound to addto the cost of running the localcommunity, and the
new firm should bear its share of thesecosts.
An effective regional developmentstrategy could combinecapital and labor
subsidies. Corporations might be inducedto locate new plants indesignated areas if the entire amount of their investmentcould be deductiblefrorTi their tax liability. Perhaps these firms couldalso be induced to hiremore of the ijn
employed workers in designatedareas if the firms were paid atemporary wage subsidy. The combination ofa capital and wage subsidy wouldbe a far stronger inducement to going firmsto locate expansion facilitiesin design,itcd depressed areas than anything thathas been triedup to now in the United
States. By limiting thewage subsidy to unemployed workerssome of the
problems encountered by theBritish REP would be avoided.And it is not hard to imagine that at leastsome corporations in the UnitedStates wouldrespond to the opportunity to investmoney that they would otherwisepa' in the form of corporate incometaxes.
This policy would have thestrong advantage,recommended by Pressman and Wildavsky, of weldingpolicy to implementationIt would have thefurther advantage of simplicity.A policy of jointcapital-labor subsidieswould mini- mize the number of decisionpoints in the regionaldevelopmentprocessIt would make maximumuse of the market mechanismand require arelatively small number ofgovernment decisions. But,one might ask, What rolewould a federal regional developmentagency play in sucha scheme? The most importanttask for an agency suchas EDA under a schemesuch as that suggested abovewould be to designateeligible areas. Thedetermination would be based,as in the past, ona demonstrated need foreconomic de- velopmeritTechnical assistance andplanning grants wouldhave to be awarded and administered,as they have been underEDA. And it wouldbe necessary to continue a substantialprogram of public works,since many areas now eligible for federalassistance still lack basicamenities. The strategy outlinedabove would workonly if a federalregional develop- nlent agency could bemore selective in thedesignation of eligibleareas than it has been in thepast. If two-thirds of thenation is declared eligiblefor regional developmentassistance, there isno conceivable regionaldevelopment pro- gram that is going to domuch good. insofaras possible, eligibility forregional development subsidiesshould be limitedto rather stringentlydefined growth centers This means,essentially, a narrowdefinition of the'hinterland," with emphasis on themovement of resourcestoward the center. Thereneed not be much feedbackto the hinterlandfor a growthcenter strategy to work.As long as we recognize theexistence ofeconomies, both internaland externalit is unreasonable to believe thatlimited regionaldevelopmentresources can be spread liberallyover a nation as largeas the United States.
/
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It is not likely that this strategy would 'solve"the nation's depressed area
problem. But as Newman pointed out in hisstudy of Appalachia, perhaps it is
time we stopped talking about solving complexeconomic problems in the
sense of achieving a textbook equilibrium. It is possible, however, thata new
approach to regional development could do muchto reduce present inequities
in the geographic distribution of income and employmentopportunities. Per-
haps that is as much as wecan realistically hope to achieve.
NOTES
The quotations are from the Statement of Purpose, Public taw 89-1 36, 89thCong., let sess,
S. 1648 (August 26,19651.
The subtitle of this short hut Interesting volume is worth giving in full. It is:'How Great Ex-
pectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland: or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Pro-
grams Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told
by Two Sympathetic Observors Who Seek to Build Moralson a Foundation of Ruined
Hopes."
The unemployment rates for 1960 and 1966 are from Nicholls and Bobbie (1969,p. 1301
and U.S. Bureau of the Census, PC (11 C6, Table 85,p. 6-506.
I am not aware that the letter was actually published. A copy of it, dated December 3, 1973,
was made available to me by the FDA staff.
Manpower Report of the President (March 1973), p. 209. Tlieic were inure than 18,000Un-
employed workers in the labor market area in 1972.
The legislative history and a description of the Aiea Redevelopment Administration are
given in Levitan (1964). This book alto contains a detailed evaluation of ARA's first two
years of experience.
The evolution of EDA's strategy has been discussed by Cameron 11970) especially
pp.92-110.
B.The demanding task of making this classification was carried Out by James Middy with the
assistance of Lorena Goodson.
I realrze that these are facile conclusions which ignore political realities. But as the report of
the General Accounting Office, discussed below, has suggested (U.S. Comptroller General
1972), some of the amenity projects funded by FDA might have been supported by other
federal agencies.
In addition, EDA commissioned a separate evaluation of its research program covering the
period t 966-1971. A report on this evaluation was prepared by EDA's Program Analysis Di-
vision for internal circulation. A panel of twenty-one academic authorities evaluated 138
studies supported by FDA. The research projects were evaluated on the basis of both sub-
stance and analytical methods. Because of the sensitive nature of this document, in v. hich a
peer group evaluated the work of other researchers who were also primarily Irons the
academic community, it was not made available for general circulation. Itian outstanding
evaluative study, however, which could serve as a model for other gosernment .igenIies
funding extensive research programs.
Four of the evaluations dealt with planning grants and technical assistance, three with
growth centers, three with rural areas, and seven with a variety of specialized activities. For
a useful summary of the business loan and public works studies, as well as other selected
evaluations, see FDA (19701.408
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'Job impact" was defined as 'the number of saved,new, and discounted future jobseui. alent to jobs providing au annualuLury uI $6,500 per year,l,issjlit'd by Structuralgrade" EDA 1970, p. 5).
Income tax abatement, in paitucular, has beena weak inducement to locate indepressed areas. Business spokesmen have pointed out that the profits earned by
new plants are low
or nonexistent during the early years of operation. Hence, theypay little tax in any even!
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